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Assessing the Laws and Customs of War: The Publication
of Customary International Humanitarian Law
by Jea n- Ma rie Henc k a er ts

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE
REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

aspects of warfare. It affords protection to a wide range of persons during wartime and limiting permissible means and methods of warfare.3
There are, however, two serious impediments to the application of these treaties in current armed conflicts, which explains
why a study on customary international humanitarian law is necessary and useful. First, treaties apply only to the states that have
ratified them. Different treaties of international humanitarian law
apply in different armed conflicts depending on which ones the
states involved in the conflict have ratified. Although the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949
have been universally ratified,
the same is not true for other
treaties of humanitarian law,
such as the Additional
Protocols. Even though
Additional Protocol I, which
regulates international conflicts, has been ratified by
more than 160 states, its applicability today is limited
because several states that have
been involved in international
armed conflicts are not party
to it. Similarly, several states in
which
non-international
armed conflicts are taking
Jean-Marie Henckaerts.
place have not ratified
Additional Protocol II, which
regulates non-international conflicts. In these non-international
armed conflicts, common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions, which sets forth the minimum protections and standards of conduct to which parties to the conflict must adhere, is
often the only applicable humanitarian treaty provision. The first
purpose of the study was to determine which rules of international humanitarian law are part of customary international law and
therefore applicable to all parties to a conflict, regardless of their
treaty obligations.
Second, humanitarian treaty law does not regulate in sufficient detail non-international armed conflicts, which comprise a
large portion of today’s conflicts because they are subject to far
fewer treaty rules. For example, Additional Protocol II contains a
mere 15 substantive articles, whereas Additional Protocol I has
more than 80. And common Article 3, although still of fundamental importance, only provides a rudimentary framework of minimum standards.4 The second purpose of the study was therefore to
determine whether customary international law regulates noninternational armed conflict in more detail than treaty law, and if
so, to what extent.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY was to overcome some of the problems
related to the application of international humanitarian treaty law.
Treaty law, principally reflected in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their Additional Protocols of 1977, is well developed and covers many

DEFINING CUSTOMARY LAW: METHODOLOGY AND
ORGANIZATION
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT of Justice describes

Jean-Marie Henckaerts is a Legal Advisor in the Legal Division of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and co-editor of the two-volume study, Customary
International Humanitarian Law.

customary international law as “a general practice accepted as law.”5 It
is widely agreed that the existence of a rule of customary international law requires the presence of two elements: state practice and a belief
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INCE THE ADOPTION OF THE GENEVA Conventions of
1949, mankind has experienced an alarming number of armed
conflicts affecting almost every continent. During this time the
four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of
1977 have provided legal protection to persons not or no longer participating directly in hostilities (the wounded, sick and shipwrecked,
persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict, and civilians). Even so, there have been numerous violations of
these treaties, which has resulted in suffering and death that might
have been avoided had international humanitarian law been better
respected. The general opinion is that violations of international
humanitarian law are not due to the inadequacy of its rules. Rather,
they stem from an unwillingness to respect the rules, insufficient
means to enforce them, uncertainty as to their application, and a lack
of awareness on the part of political leaders, commanders, combatants,
and the public.
The International Conference for the Protection of War
Victims, convened in Geneva in August–September 1993, discussed ways to address violations of international humanitarian
law. Its Final Declaration reaffirmed “the necessity to make the
implementation of humanitarian law more effective” and called
upon the Swiss government “to convene an open-ended intergovernmental group of experts to study practical means of promoting
full respect for and compliance with that law, and to prepare a
report for submission… to the next session of the International
Conference of the Red Cross (ICRC).”1 Accordingly, the
Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War
Victims met in Geneva in January 1995 and recommended that
the ICRC prepare, with the assistance of IHL experts representing
various geographical regions and different legal systems, and in
consultation with experts from governments and international
organizations, a report on customary rules of humanitarian law
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.
This report would seek to clarify the content of customary humanitarian law, which is by definition a body of unwritten rules.
Nearly 10 years later and based on this extensive research, a
5,000 page study by the ICRC, now referred to as the “study,”
Customary International Humanitarian Law, has been published.2
It identifies 161 rules found to have attained the status of customary humanitarian law and seeks to provide a snapshot of custom
today that is as accurate as possible. This study should not be seen,
however, as the final word on custom; it is not exhaustive because
the formation of customary law is an ongoing process.
Nonetheless, as this article details, the study constitutes an important tool for anyone involved with humanitarian law.
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a rule of customary international law by influencing subsequent
practice of states and international organizations.
The practice of armed opposition groups, such as codes of
conduct, commitments made to observe certain rules of international humanitarian law, and other statements, does not constitute
state practice. Although such practice may contain evidence of the
acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts, its
legal significance is unclear and was not relied upon in the study to
prove the existence of customary international law.
Although some time will normally elapse before a rule of customary international law emerges, there is no specified time frame.
Rather, state practice has to be weighed to assess whether it is sufficiently “dense” to create a rule of customary international law, which
means that it has to be virtually uniform, extensive, and representative.9 To be virtually uniform means different states must not have
engaged in substantially different conduct. The jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice shows that contrary practice that
appears at first sight to undermine the uniformity of the practice
concerned does not prevent the formation of a rule of customary
international law as long as this contrary practice is condemned by
other states or denied by the government itself. Through such condemnation or denial, the rule in question is actually confirmed.10
Where there is overwhelming evidence of state practice in support of
a rule, alongside repeated evidence of violations of that rule, such
violations do not challenge the existence of the rule in question.
States wishing to change an existing rule of customary international
law have to do so through official practice and must claim to be acting as of right. In addition, for a rule of general customary international law to come into existence, state practice must be both extensive and representative. It does not, however, need to be universal; a
“general” practice suffices.11 No precise number or percentage is
required because it is not simply a question of how many states participate in the practice, but also which states participate.12
The study took no view on whether it is legally possible to be
a “persistent objector” in relation to customary rules of international humanitarian law. Although many commentators believe
that it is not possible under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to be a persistent objector in the case of jus
cogens norms (peremptory norms of international law from whichno derogation is permitted), there are others who doubt the continued validity of the persistent objector concept altogether.13 If
one accepts that it is legally possible to be a persistent objector, the
state concerned must have objected to the emergence of a new
norm during its formation and continue to object persistently
afterward; it is not possible to be a “subsequent objector.”14

that such practice is required, prohibited, or allowed, depending on
the nature of the rule, as a matter of law (opinio juris).

SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF STATE PRACTICE
State practice must be looked at from two angles: what practice contributes to the creation of customary international law
(selection of state practice) and whether this practice establishes a
rule of customary international law (assessment of state practice).
Both physical and verbal acts of states constitute practice that contributes to the creation of customary international law.6 Physical
acts can be gleaned, for example, from reports on military operations, such as the U.S. Defense Department’s report to Congress
on the Conduct of the 1991 Gulf War. Verbal acts include various
kinds of documents, including military manuals, legislation, case
law, and official statements such as diplomatic protests.
Resolutions adopted by states in international organizations or at
conferences are normally not binding in themselves and therefore
the value accorded to any particular resolution in the assessment of

“The general opinion is that
violations of international
humanitarian law are not due to
the inadequacy of its rules.
Rather, they stem from an
unwillingness to respect the
rules, insufficient means to
enforce them, uncertainty as to
their application, and a lack of
awareness on the part of
political leaders, commanders,
combatants, and the public.”

OPINIO JURIS
The requirement of opinio juris in establishing the existence of
a rule of customary international law refers to the legal conviction
that a particular practice is carried out “as of right.” It is usually not
necessary to demonstrate separately the existence of an opinio juris
because it is generally contained within a particularly dense practice. In situations where a practice is ambiguous, however, opinio
juris plays an important role in determining whether or not that
practice counts toward the formation of custom. This is often the
case with omissions, i.e., when states do not act or react but it is not
clear why. In such cases both the International Court of Justice and
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have
sought to establish the separate existence of an opinio juris to determine whether instances of ambiguous practice counted toward the
establishment of customary international law.15

the formation of a rule of customary international law depends on
its content, degree of acceptance, and the consistency of related
state practice.7
Although decisions of international courts are subsidiary
sources of international law,8 they do not constitute state practice.
Unlike national courts, international courts are not state organs.
Nevertheless, the decisions of international courts were included in
the study because a finding by an international court that a rule of
customary international law exists constitutes persuasive evidence
to that effect. In addition, because of the precedential value of their
decisions, international courts can contribute to the emergence of
9

I, it does not contain specific provisions requiring respect for the
protection of humanitarian relief personnel, as well as objects and
obliging parties to a conflict, to allow and facilitate the passage of
humanitarian relief for civilians in need. These requirements have
crystallized, however, into customary international law applicable
in both international and non-international armed conflicts as a
result of widespread, representative, and virtually uniform practice
to that effect.

IMPACT OF TREATY LAW
Treaties are also relevant in determining the existence of customary international law because they help shed light on how
states view certain rules of international law. Hence, the ratification, interpretation, and implementation of a treaty, including
reservations and statements of interpretation made upon ratification, were included in the study. The study took the cautious
approach that widespread ratification is only an indication and has
to be assessed in relation to other elements of practice, specifically
the practice of states not party to the treaty in question.

SELECTED ISSUES ON THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
In addition to reaffirming a number of customary rules,
Additional Protocols I and II introduced a number of rules that
were new at the time of adoption in 1977. One such rule is the prohibition of attacks on works and installations containing dangerous
forces, even when these objects are military objectives, if such attack
may cause the release of dangerous forces and severe losses among
the civilian population.21 Although it is not clear whether these spe-

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
TO DETERMINE THE BEST WAY of fulfilling the mandate entrusted to
the ICRC, the authors consulted a group of academic experts in international humanitarian law, who formed the study’s 12-member
Steering Committee.16 The Steering Committee adopted a plan of
action in June 1996 and research started the following October.
Research was conducted using both national and international sources
reflecting state practice, including 47 reports on state practice, 40
reports on recent conflicts from the ICRC archives, and two consultations with 35 humanitarian law experts from around the world. The
study focused on six areas, around which the rules were structured: (1)
the principle of distinction; (2) specifically protected persons and
objects; (3) specific methods of warfare (4) weapons; (5) treatment of
civilians and persons hors de combat; and (6) implementation.

“In light of the achievements to
date and the work that remains
to be done, the study should
not be seen as the end, but
rather as the beginning of a new
process aimed at improving
understanding of and
agreement on the principles and
rules of international
humanitarian law.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS
IN TOTAL, THE STUDY ARTICULATED 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law.17 Several of the study’s main conclusions
are summarized below.

INTERNATIONAL AND NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS
The practice collected in the framework of the study bears
witness to the profound impact of Additional Protocol I on the
practice of states in both international and non-international
armed conflicts. In particular, the study found that the basic principles of Additional Protocol I, many of which were already considered to be customary at the time of the Protocol’s adoption in
1977, have been very widely accepted, even more widely than its
ratification record would suggest. Although the study did not seek
to determine the customary nature of specific treaty provisions, it
became clear that many customary rules are identical or similar to
those found in treaty law.18 With respect to non-international
armed conflict, Additional Protocol II similarly has had a farreaching effect on practice and, as a result, many of its provisions
are now considered to be part of customary international law.19
Yet the most significant contribution of customary international humanitarian law to the regulation of internal armed conflicts is that it goes beyond the provisions of Additional Protocol
II. Indeed, practice has created a substantial number of customary
rules that are more detailed than the often rudimentary provisions
of Additional Protocol II. Practice has thus filled important gaps in
the regulation of internal conflicts parallel to those in Additional
Protocol I, but applicable as customary law to non-international
armed conflicts. This covers basic principles on the conduct of hostilities, rules on specifically protected persons, and objects and specific methods of warfare.20
For example, Additional Protocol II contains only a very general provision on humanitarian relief. Unlike Additional Protocol

cific rules have become part of customary law, practice shows that
states are conscious of the high risk of severe incidental losses that
can result from attacks against such works and installations when
they constitute military objectives. Consequently, they recognize
that in any armed conflict particular care must be taken in case of
attack to avoid severe losses among the civilian population. This
requirement was found to be a part of customary international law
that is applicable in any armed conflict.
Another new rule introduced in Additional Protocol I is the
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare that are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment. Since the adoption of
Additional Protocol I, this prohibition has received such extensive
support in state practice that it has crystallized into customary law,
even though some states have persistently maintained that the rule
does not apply to nuclear weapons.22 Beyond this specific rule, the
study found that the natural environment is considered to be a
civilian object and is protected by the same principles and rules that
10

ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER CLARIFICATION
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protect other civilian objects, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in
attack. This means that no part of the natural environment may be
made the object of attack unless it is a military objective. Further,
an attack against a military objective that may be expected to cause
incidental damage to the environment, which would be excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.
There are also issues that are not addressed in the Additional
Protocols. For example, the Protocols do not contain any specific
provision concerning the protection of personnel and objects
involved in a peacekeeping mission. In practice, however, such personnel and objects were given protection against attack equivalent
to that of civilians and civilian objects. As a result, Rule 33 prohibits attacks against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. Finally, a number of issues related to the conduct of hostilities are regulated by the Hague Regulations, which have long
been considered customary in international armed conflict.23
Some of their rules, however, are now also accepted as customary
in non-international conflict, such as the rules that prohibit
destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary, unless
required by military necessity, and pillage.24

The study revealed a number of areas where practice is not
clear. For example, although the terms “combatants” and “civilians” are clearly defined in international armed conflicts,25 practice
is ambiguous as to whether members of armed opposition groups
are considered members of armed forces or civilians in non-international armed conflicts. It is not clear, therefore, whether members of armed opposition groups are civilians who lose their protection from attack when directly participating in hostilities or
whether members of these groups are liable to attack as such.
Additional Protocol II, for example, does not contain a definition
of civilians or of the civilian population even though these terms
are used in several provisions.26 Subsequent treaties that are applicable in non-international armed conflicts similarly use the terms
civilians and civilian population without defining them.27
A related area of uncertainty affecting the regulation of both
international and non-international armed conflicts is the absence
of a precise definition of the term “direct participation in hostilities.” Loss of protection against attack is clear and uncontested
when a civilian uses weapons or other means to commit acts of violence, but there is considerable practice that gives little or no guidance on the interpretation of the term. Related to this issue is the
question of how to qualify a person in case of doubt.28 Another
issue still open to question is the exact scope and application of the
principle of proportionality in attack. Although the study revealed
widespread support for this principle, it does not provide more
clarification than contained in treaty law as to how to balance military advantage against incidental civilian losses.

is less clear to what extent other specific implementation mechanisms that are binding upon states are also binding upon armed
opposition groups.
A state is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to it and is required to make full reparation for
the loss or injury caused by such violations. It is unclear whether
armed opposition groups incur an equivalent responsibility for violations committed by their members. As stated above, armed opposition groups must respect international humanitarian law and
operate under a “responsible command.” As a result, it can be
argued that armed opposition
groups incur responsibility for acts
committed by persons forming a
part of such groups. The consequences of such responsibility,
however, are not clear. In particular, it is unclear to what extent
armed opposition groups are under
an obligation to make full reparation, even though in many countries victims can bring a civil suit
for damages against the offenders.
When it comes to individual
responsibility, customary international humanitarian law places
criminal responsibility on all persons who commit, who order the
commission of, or who are otherwise responsible as commanders or
superiors for the commission of war crimes. The implementation of
the war crimes regime is an obligation incumbent upon states. States
may discharge this obligation by setting up international or mixed
tribunals to that effect.

CONCLUSION
A BRIEF OVERVIEW of some of the findings of the study shows that
the principles and rules contained in treaty law have received widespread acceptance in practice and have greatly influenced the formation of customary international law. Although many of these rules
were already customary at the time of their adoption, others have since
become part of customary international law. As such, they are binding
on all states regardless of the ratification status of treaties and, in the
case of those rules applicable to all parties in non-international armed
conflicts, on armed opposition groups as well.
The study also indicates that many rules of customary international law apply in both international and non-international
armed conflicts and shows the extent to which state practice has
gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the rules applicable
to non-international armed conflicts. The regulation of the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons in internal armed
conflicts is thus more detailed and complete than that which exists
under treaty law. It remains to be explored, however, to what
extent this more detailed regulation is sufficient or whether further
developments in the law are required.
The study also reveals areas where the law is not clear and
points to issues that require further clarification, such as the definition of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, the concept of direct participation in hostilities, and the scope and application of the principle of proportionality. In light of the achievements to date and the work that remains to be done, the study
should not be seen as the end, but rather as the beginning of a new
process aimed at improving understanding of and agreement on
the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. HRB

IMPLEMENTATION
A number of rules on the implementation of international
humanitarian law have become part of customary international
law. In particular, each party to a conflict must respect and ensure
respect for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and
other persons or groups acting on its instructions or under its
direction or control. As a result, each party, including armed opposition groups, must provide instruction in international humanitarian law to its armed forces. Beyond these general obligations, it
11
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